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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By this appeal, Appellant seeks (1) the reversal of the trial court's decision 
which awards Mrs. Thompson, Appellee, a one-half interest in the monies which 
had accumulated in Mr. Thompson's 401(k) retirement account during the years of 
marriage without first backing-out Mr. Thompson's appreciated separate, pre-
marital contribution to the same 401(k) retirement account; and (2) the reversal of 
the decision which awards the Appellee a one-half interest in the entire equity held 
in the Utah Home without first backing-out the amount necessary to reimburse Mr. 
Thompson's separate, pre-marital contribution to the subject real property and the 
appreciation accrued upon that same pre-martial contribution. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The Parties were married in California in February, 2002. (R. at 206). 
2. In 1990, approximately twelve (12) years before the parties' marriage, Mr. 
Thompson initiated a 401(k) plan. (R. at 198). 
3. This 401(k) account was derived from and funded through his employment 
with the same employer in both California and Utah. (Id.) 
4. For period of twelve (12) years, Mr. Thompson made pre-marital 
contributions to this 401(k) account. (Id.) 
5. At the time of the marriage in 2002, the 401(k) account held a value of 
$68,784. (R. at 198 and 213 ^5). 
6. Mrs. Thompson did not made any financial contributions to this 401(k) 
account during the years of marriage. (R. at 198). 
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7. At the time of trial, the value of the account was $177,352. (R. at 198 and 
213). 
8. The average rate of growth within the 401(k) account between and during 
the marriage, 2002 through 2007, varied between a negative eighteen point 
twenty-two percent (-18.22%) and a positive thirty-one point sixty-five percent 
(+31.65%). (R. at 158-159, 198; Exhibits 25 & 26 (Addenda)). 
9. Mr. Thompson's original separate, pre-marital amount of $68,784 had 
appreciated to $136,385.21 by the time of trial. (R. at 198). 
10. The figure of $136,385.21 represented Mr. Thompson's appreciated value 
of his separate, pre-marital contribution. (Id.) 
11. The Trial Court concluded that the value in the 401(k) account at the time 
of trial was $177,352. (R. at 207 and 213). 
12. The Trial Court simply deducted the unappreciated, pre-marital value 
($68,784.00) held in the 401(k) account at the time of marriage from the value 
held in the 401(k) account at the time of trial ($177,302.00). (Id.) 
13. The Trial Court then found that $108,518 held in the 401(k) plan was the 
marital value which had accumulated during the marriage. (Id.) 
14. The Trial Court did not account for, nor back-out, any portion of the 
appreciated value which had accrued upon Mr. Thompson's separate, pre-marital 
value held in this 401(k) account. (Cf. R at 207 and 213 w 198). 
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15. Several years prior to his marriage to Mrs. Thompson, Mr. Thompson 
purchased and continuously owned a home in California ("California Home") as 
his sole and separate property. (R. at 193, 196 and 213), 
16. After the marriage in 2002, the parties resided in the California Home. (R. 
at 193, 196, 206 and 213). 
17. However, Mrs. Thompson did not contribute anything to the California 
Home, nor was her name ever placed on title or on any indebtedness secured by 
the California Home. (R. at 193-196). 
18. Both before and after the marriage, Mr. Thompson continued to pay all of 
the expenses, premiums, tax assessments, and all other related costs to the 
maintenance and retention of the California Home. (Id.) 
19. In 2005, Mr. Thompson received an employment offer in the State of Utah 
and the parties subsequently relocated to Utah. (R. at 194 and 206). 
20. In 2005, Mr. Thompson sold his California Home and applied $86,410.25 
derived from the net sale proceeds from his California Home to the purchase of a 
home located in St. George, Utah ("Utah Home"). (R. at 206-07 f 9). 
21. Mrs. Thompson did not make any financial contribution towards the 
acquisition of the Utah Home. (R. at 194). 
22. However, Mrs. Thompson's name was added as a joint tenant to the title of 
the Utah Home and she had signed on the mortgage secured by the Utah Home. 
(R. at 158, 194 and 206). 
23. The present fair market value of the Utah Home at time of trial was 
$450,000.00 subject to an existing mortgage of $326,523. (R. at 207 %l 1). 
24. The Utah Home was purchased for $399,900.00. (R. at 158). Thus, there 
was an appreciated value between the purchase price and value at the time of trial 
of twelve point five percent (12.5%). (R. at 196-197). 
25. Petitioner argued at trial that the appreciated value of his separate, pre-
marital contribution to the Utah Home was $97,211.53 (the pre-marital 
contribution plus the 12.5% appreciation); an increase of $10,801.28. (Id.) 
26. Had the back-out method been used by the trial court, the marital equity 
would have therefore been $26,965.46 (i.e., the fair market value of $450,000 less 
$326,523 mortgage, less $97,211.54 (i.e., Mx. Thompson's appreciated pre-marital 
contribution)). (Id.) Therefore, one-half of the gross marital equity would have 
been set at $13,132.73. (Id.) 
27. The Trial Court held that the Utah Home was a marital asset. (R. at 206). 
28. The Trial Court found that the sale proceeds from the sale of the California 
Home had been commingled into the marital estate, that "[djuring the next two or 
three years of marriage [between 2002 and 2005], Petitioner [Appellee] acquired 
some community property interest in Respondent's [Appellant's] California home, 
but the evidence before the Court does not allow this to be quantified", and title to 
the Utah Home was held by both parties. (R. at 206,116-10). 
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29. The Trial Court did not award any portion of Mr. Thompson's pre-marital 
contribution of $86,410.25 nor any accrued appreciation upon his separate, pre-
marital interest (Cf. R. at 206-207, 213 with 196-197). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under Utah law, equity requires that each party retain the separate property 
he or she brought into the marriage. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). In order to properly effect an equitable distribution of 
property, the trial court should have utilized the "back-out method" by subtracting 
the amount necessary to reimburse Mr. Thompson for his separate, pre-martial 
property along the the appreciated value of his pre-marital property. Hayes v. 
Hayes, 20050645 (2006 UT App. 289); Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Utah 
App. 1993); and Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (UT App. 1990), 
It is undisputed that prior to his marriage to Mrs. Thompson, Mr. 
Thompson opened a distinct 401(k) retirement account through his employer (R. at 
198, 207 f 13 and 213); that during the twelve (12) years prior to the parties' 
marriage, Mr. Thompson's 401(k) had accumulated $68,784 (Id.); and that at trial, 
there was not any dispute that Mr. Thompson's 401(k) account held a value of 
$177,352. (Id.) Additionally, during the marriage, the 401(k) account had 
experienced growth and fluctuation between a negative eighteen point twenty-two 
percent (-18.22%) and a positive thirty-one point sixty-five percent (31.65%). (R. 
at 159 Exhibits 25 and 26). 
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The Appellee did not argue at trial nor did the trial court make any findings 
that the funds held in the 401(k) account had been comingled, nor that she had 
preserved, maintained or that there was some exception to the general law of 
awarding separate, pre-marital property to the party who brought the same into the 
marriage. Therefore, Mr. Thompson should have been awarded his principal 
along with appreciated value of his pre-marital contributions to his retirement 
account as his sole and separate property. Hayes v. Hayes, 20050645 (2006 UT 
App. 289); Hall v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Utah App. 1993); Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1172 (UT App. 1990); and Haumont v. Haumont 793 P.2d 421, 424 
(UTApp. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
L THE EVIDENCE HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY MARSHALLED 
The evidence has been sufficiently marshalled to permit the review of the 
matters raised on this appeal. The dispostive findings of fact made by the Trial 
Court were stipulated and uncontroverted. There is not any controversy as to the 
credibility of the witnesses and/or the documentary evidence which established 
these facts. Therefore, a trial transcipt is not helpful for review of this case on 
appeal. Appellant has adequately and appropriately provided citations to the 
Record before this court on appeal as to the evidence and findings of facts made 
by the trial court. The issue on appeal is whether or not the trial court failed to 
follow the law regarding the allocation of funds held in Mr. Thompson's separate, 
pre-marital retirement account. 
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The Trial Court did not make any specific findings which support that the 
legal conclusion that pre-marital contributions to the 401(k) somehow lost their 
separate property characteristics (e.g., through commingling of funds by the 
Appellee, preservation by Appellee, conversion into marital property, etc). The 
Trial Court made specific findings based upon stipulated and uncontroverted 
evidence that there was a specific amount held in the 401(k) at the time of the 
marriage and there was a specific amount held in the same pre-marital account at 
the time of the divorce. The legal error occurred when the Trial Court failed to 
award Mr. Thompson the true value of his separate, pre-marital property by 
employing the simple back-out method to determine the value of the appreciated 
separate pre-marital property. 
Trial courts are to make adequate findings on all material issues. The 
failure to do so constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record arc clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment. 
Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The findings made by a 
trial court must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough subsidiary facts to 
reveal the steps the court took to reach its conclusion on each factual issue 
presented. Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Additionally, in divorce proceedings, any deviation from the general rule of law 
must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial 
court's basis for such deviation. Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 262. 
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In the present case, there was not any competing nor controverted 
testimony about the factual issues concerning Mr. Thompson's 401(k). The issues 
of fact were undisputed and uncontroverted both at trial and on this appeal. There 
are not any findings by the trial court that would indicate that the trial court 
determined that there were any exceptions to the general legal principles 
governing the award of separate, pre-marital property. There were not any 
findings to support the deviation from the general rule of law. Therefore, without 
such findings there is no support for the court's decision to award Mis. Thompson 
of a portion of the appreciated value which had specifically accrued upon Mr. 
Thompson's pre-marital interest which had accumulated for 12 years prior to his 
marriage to Mrs. Thompson. See Chiid v. Child, 194 P.3d 205, 2008 UT App 338. 
In Child, at the time of marriage, the husband owned twenty-five percent 
(25%) of a rental business. During the course of the marriage, the value of 
husband's ownership interest had increased in value. The trial court treated the 
treated the increased value of husband's ownership in the rental business as 
marital property and the husband appealed. The Child case reiterates the general 
rule that equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she 
brought into the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property, 
(citing Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The Child case does note that such separate property can. however, become 
part of the marital estate if (1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense 
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, 
8 
thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed 
or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring 
spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse, (citing Mortensen 
v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). The Court of Appeals stated that 
"we see no findings by the trial court that would indicate that it found either of 
these exceptions. Without any such findings, there is no support for the trial court's 
conclusion that the appreciation of Husband's share of the business is marital 
property, to be divided equally." 2008 UT App 338, f 10. Thus, the decision of 
the trial court was subsequently reversed the decision of the trial court and 
awarded the husband the full value of his share in the business. 
Equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she 
brought into the marriage. Haumont v. Haumonf 793 P.2d 421, 424 (UT App. 
1990). In determining the value of marital equity, a trial court should have utilized 
the "back-out method" of "first subtracting] the amount necessary to reimburse fa 
party's] contribution" to the marital property before dividing the marital property 
equally." Hah, 858 P.2d at 1023 (UT App. 1993). The trial court committed a 
legal error when it failed to utilize the "back-out" method and failed to make any 
findings which supported a devition from this legal principle. Mr. Thompson did 
not receive the amount necessary to reimburse him for his separate, pre-marital 
contributions to the marital interests; both in the pre-marital 401(k) account and 
his equity from the separate pre-marital California Home. See Hall. 858 P.2d at 
1023 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Preston, 646 P.2d at 706 (Utah 1982); and Haves. 
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2006 WL 1917822, 2006 Utah Ct. App. 289. By failing to account for and factor 
in the appreciated growth upon Mr. Thompson's pre-martial contribution, the trial 
court actually awarded Mrs. Thompson a portion of the appreciation/growth which 
had accrued upon Mr. Thompson's separate, pre-martial contribution; thereby 
awarding her his separate, pre-marital property. The Trial Court did not make any-
finding as to any justification for awarding Mrs. Thompson more than her portion 
of the marital portion of Mr. Thompson's 401(k) account. 
IL APPELLEE FAILS IN HER BURDEN OF PROOF AND 
MARSHALLING. 
The intial burden of proof was upon the Appellant to determine the 
existence of separate, pre-marital property and the appreciated growth of the same 
to the time of the divorce. This burden of proof, along with the marshalling 
requirement on appeal, was met by the Appellant. (R. 198, 213. Exhibits 25 & 26 
and as cited in Appelant's Brief). These findings of fact were uncontroverted and 
undisputed. Therefore, the credibility of witnesses is not at issue on appeal. The 
misapplication of the law by the trial court and its deviation from the legal 
principles governing the allocation and distribution of separate, pre-marital 
property are at issue. 
Thereafter, the burden of proof then shifts to the Appellee to demonstrate 
that there were exceptions to the general legal principles and law wheh support an 
exception to the general rule of the award of separate, pre-marital property. The 
general rule regarding pre-marital contributions to retirement accounts is that 
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equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into 
the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property, unless one of the 
exceptions applies. Once the contributing spouse satisfies his/her burden of 
showing that the contributions were separate and pre-marital, the burden then 
shifts to the non-contributing spouse to show that one or more of the exceptions 
applies. In the instant case, the Appellee wife did not argue at trial nor in her 
brief, that any of the exceptions to the general legal principle apply. 
Appellee fails to provide any sufficent evidence or argument that the 
general legal rule governing separate, pre-marital should not apply. There is not 
any evidence that the 401(k) funds were commingled with marital assets or that 
Mrs. Thompson had by her efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the 
separate property. Ergo, Mr. Thompson was entitled to all of his pre-marital 
contributions to the retirement fund, plus the interest attributable to those 
contributions, because the wife did not, through her efforts, augment, maintain, or 
protect the separate propeity. See Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, \ 24, 147 
P.3d 464 (holding that since the marital and pre-marital funds in a 401(k) account 
could be separately identified, the trial court correctly divided the funds by 
awarding the husband his pre-marital interest, plus appreciation on that amount, 
and equitably dividing the separate marital portion of the account). At trial, an 
erroneous legal conclusion was made which was not supported by any factual 
determination to support the deviation from the general law and supporting the 
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award of separate, pre-marital property held in Mr.Thompson's 401 (k) to Mrs. 
Thompson. 
According to Rule 11(e) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, a trial 
transcript may be provided on the relevant evidence to a challenged finding or 
conclusion. Here, however, neither appellant nor appelllee on appeals claims that 
the transcript contains evidence bearing on the determination of the retirement 
account. Appellee does not provide any portion of the transcript to show that the 
trial court deviated from legal principles based upon any exceptions to these 
general principles governing the back-out method and the awarding of separate, 
pre-marital property. Since there are not any facts which show exceptions to the 
general legal principles, there is not any need for a transcript in order to resolve 
the retirement account issue on appeal. See Smith v. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919, 2004 
UT55. 
In Smith, Appellee urged the appellate court to uphold a summary 
judgment, asserting that since the appellant failed to provide a copy of the 
summary judgment hearing transcript the district court's decisions are presumed to 
be valid. Nevertheless, the appellate court, noting that the appellee misconstrued 
the meaning of Rule 11(e)(2), stated that "the rule simply requires appellants to 
include a transcript of all evidence relevant to a challenged finding or conclusion. 
The Smith case notes that neither party claimed that the missiag transcript contains 
evidence bearing on the determination of the case, thus, appellants had no 
obligation to include the transcript in the record on appeal. 
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Moreover, Appellee fails to address the numerous cases cited in 
Appellant's Breif which deal with the issue of separate, pre-marital contributions, 
along with the accrued interest, to retirement funds. E.g., Burt v. Burt, Dunn v. 
Dunn, and Oliekan v. Oliekan). Moreover, none of the cases cited by the Appellee 
deal with the issue of separte, pr-marital contributions and the accrued interest on 
those contributions. The cases cited by the Appellee merely state that retirement 
benefits accumulated during a marriage are marital property; a fact which the 
Appellant has not disputed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, general accounting principles and upon the legal 
principles espoused in Utah law, the Decree of Divorce regarding the 
determination of the martial equity in the 401(k) account and the Utah Home 
should be reversed. Mr. Thompson should be permitted to recover his separate, 
pre-marital principal plus the appreciated value of his contributions to the 
acquisition of the Utah Home and retain the principal and appreciated value of his 
separate, pre-marital contributions held in his 401(k) retirement-account. 
Dated this 15th day of January, 2 0 0 9 . ^ ^ ^ " ^ V / ^ 
S ha wrih^FamO 
Counsel for Appellant 
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